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Abstract
To ensure the secure transmission of data, cryptography is treated as the most
effective solution. Cryptographic key is an important entity in this procedure.
In general, randomly generated cryptographic key (of 256 bits) is difficult to
remember. However, such a key needs to be stored in a protected place or
transported through a shared communication line which, in fact, poses another
threat to security. As an alternative, researchers advocate the generation of
cryptographic key using the biometric traits of both sender and receiver during
the sessions of communication, thus avoiding key storing and at the same time
without compromising the strength in security. Nevertheless, the biometric-
based cryptographic key generation possesses few concerns such as privacy of
biometrics, sharing of biometric data between both communicating users (i.e.,
sender and receiver), and generating revocable key from irrevocable biometric.
This work addresses the above-mentioned concerns.
In this work, a framework for secure communication between two users using
fingerprint based crypto-biometric system has been proposed. For this, Diffie-
Hellman (DH) algorithm is used to generate public keys from private keys of
both sender and receiver which are shared and further used to produce a sym-
metric cryptographic key at both ends. In this approach, revocable key for
symmetric cryptography is generated from irrevocable fingerprint. The biomet-
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ric data is neither stored nor shared which ensures the security of biometric
data, and perfect forward secrecy is achieved using session keys. This work also
ensures the long-term security of messages communicated between two users.
Based on the experimental evaluation over four datasets of FVC2002 and NIST
special database, the proposed framework is privacy-preserving and could be
utilized onto real access control systems.
Keywords: Biometric security, Diversity, Fingerprint, Minutiae, Revocability,
Template security
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The identity of a user is lost if user’s original biometric information is com-
promised. The biometric systems which integrate biometrics with cryptogra-
phy are called crypto-biometric systems [1]. For better security of a crypto-
graphic system, keys used for encryption and decryption must be long enough
to be unbreakable. Knowledge-based (the key is remembered by the user) and
possession-based (key stored in smart card etc.) authentication systems are not
secure due to the fact that long keys cause user inconvenience to remember
and smart cards can be stolen or misplaced. Moreover, storing long keys on a
system is costly and not secure. Biometrics-based authentication systems can
alleviate the limitations of above-mentioned systems [2]. A user’s biometric is
integrated with cryptography using either key-generation techniques in which
cryptographic key is generated from one’s biometric or key-binding techniques
in which cryptographic key is fused to the original biometric data [3]. When
user A wants to send a message to user B, A first encrypts the message using a
key K and then sends this encrypted message to B. B can decrypt this message
using key K only. For this, either the key K or some information to generate
the same key K at both ends (A and B) must be shared between two communi-
cating users. In both cases, sharing of some information is required. Therefore,
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there is need of securely sharing information over the non-secure communication
channel.
1.2. Existing approaches
In biometric cryptosystems (BCs), biometric data is combined using cryp-
tographic keys to provide security and privacy in user’s authentication. As
described in Section 1, the cryptographic keys are derived from biometric data
of end users using a hash function (one way) or user defined algorithm in key
generation schemes whereas key-binding systems transform the biometric infor-
mation using key.
Few of the approaches have been proposed to generate cryptographic key
from biometric traits [4, 5, 6, 7]. Monrose et al. [4] proposed a technique which
records a user’s voice while speaking a password. Different segments of a pass-
word are mapped to a random look-up table to derive the cryptographic key.
Hao et al. [5] proposed a technique which incorporates the dynamic information
like velocity, pressure, altitude, and azimuth. Feature coding was used to quan-
tize each feature into bits which were concatenated to form a cryptographic key.
Chen et al. [7] utilized radon transform onto 3D face data to produce 1-D bit
string. Further, keys of suitable length for 128-bit Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) are derived. Rathgeb et al. [6] proposed a technique which derives
iriscodes using the method implemented by Masek [8]. Next, the most stable
bits within iris codes are selected and their positions are utilized to construct
biometric keys.
In key-binding schemes, Soutar et al. [9] proposed a technique which links
the biometric feature string with an N -bit cryptographic key. During linking,
redundancy is added by applying a repetitive code structure. Next, the hash of
cryptographic key is stored along with template for secure authentication. Juels
et al. [10] introduced a fuzzy commitment scheme which binds a codeword to
the witness (biometric data). The hash values are stored as the commitment
for authentication. Hao et al. [1] applied the fuzzy commitment scheme onto
2048-bit iris-codes. Next, Hadamard and Reed-Solomon error correction codes
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are utilized to correct bit errors. The fuzzy vault scheme [11] is the most popular
technique for the key-binding schemes. The main idea is to utilize the biometric
information to lock a secret key. Clancy et al. [12] applied the fuzzy vault
scheme onto a set of minutiae points of a fingerprint. The minutiae positions
are mapped to a polynomial and chaff points are added to construct a random
vault. Reed-Solomon codes are applied to reconstruct the polynomial secure
authentication. Kanade et al. [13] proposed a three-factor key regeneration for
iris-based authentication system. A user-specific shufing key derived using a
password is used to randomize the iris code. Iris code shufing reduces the error
structure in the iris code since the errors gets spread out. Further, Hadamard
codes are used for correcting remaining bit-errors. In another work, Kanade et
al. [14] proposed cancelable biometric system with fuzzy commitment based key
regeneration scheme. First, a key is randomly generated and then encoded into a
pseudo code using Error Correcting Codes (ECC). A cancelable transformation
is applied on the reference biometric data of the user. This transformed data is
then XORed with the pseudo code to obtain a locked code.
In present era, researchers are working onto key management for biometric
based authentication. Very little work has been proposed about a framework
for secure communication on a network using crypto-biometric system. Barman
et al. [15] proposed a system in which both sender and receiver exchange their
cancelable biometrics using key-based steganography. Kanade et al. [16] pro-
posed a crypto-biometric system for establishing secure communication session
between two clients. Their method involves CARA (Central Authority for Reg-
istration and Authentication) with which the clients are registered. Barman
et al. [17] proposed a key exchange protocol to integrate the biometric data
of two communicating users to bind a secret key (i.e., the session key) that is
used for secure message communication. First, the fingerprint data is converted
into a binary string to generate a cancelable template. These bit-strings are
used to generate mutual lockers and personalized lockers. Cryptographic keys
are protected and exchanged using these lockers. Panchal et al. [18] proposed a
technique in which a unique code is derived from original fingerprint features us-
4
ing the convolution coding principle. Next, the unique code is used to generate
a cryptographic key for encryption and decryption of the user’s document.
1.3. Motivation and contributions
In key generation schemes, the following issues may arise. They are (i) de-
formations in the biometric data may derive an erroneous key, (ii) generation
of a cryptographic key may require the transmission of biometric data over a
network and (iii) there is a need of revocable keys since biometric data is irrevo-
cable and irreplaceable. In key-binding based schemes, errors in the biometric
data results to derive erroneous helper data affecting the overall performance
of authentication system. The crypto-biometric system providing secure com-
munication onto a network also have some limitations. Storing of biometric
templates is one of such issues which should be avoided. Further, one time
password (OTP) based communication requires that a user has to remember it
for the whole session. Also, compromise may results into privacy elusion.
A crypto-biometric system for secure communication among different users
require (i) the generation of unique cryptographic keys from both sender and
receiver, (ii) secure transmission of keys among users and (iii) should be se-
cure from all such possible attacks. Moreover, it should also provide privacy
to biometrics of users along with generating revocable and non-invertible cryp-
tographic key from biometric data of users. This work aims to address above
mentioned concerns. In this work, a complete framework for secure commu-
nication among users on a network using crypto-biometric system has been
proposed to provide perfect forward secrecy. The sedulous contribution of
our method is that we do not store the cryptographic key anywhere.
Also, there is no need to store the original biometric template of a
user to generate the key. Therefore, there is no overhead of main-
taining the cryptographic in our approach. The contributions of our work
are described as follows:
1. In this approach, public key cryptography has been used to generate sym-
metric cryptographic key from fingerprints of users. For this, the DH
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algorithm of public key cryptography has been used to generate symmet-
ric cryptographic keys.
2. The proposed system ensures the avoidance of biometric template storage
or cryptographic key, either in a central database or a smart-card.
3. The proposed system fulfills the requirement of generating a revocable
and non-invertible biometric template to provide secure communication
between sender and receiver.
4. Use of a central authority and public key cryptography algorithms such
as DH and RSA provide security against various attacks including the
Man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A brief review of existing
related work is described in section 2. Section 3 describes the proposed ap-
proach in detail. Experimental results and security analysis of this method are
presented in section 3 and 4, respectively. Finally, the paper is concluded in
section 5 with a glimpse on future direction.
2. Proposed methodology
The proposed work initially extracts pair-minutiae features from the sender
and receiver. A binary string is obtained after quantization and binning. Next,
a random key based permutation is applied on feature bit string to obtain a
permuted binary string. This binary string is hashed using SHA256 to generate
a 256-bit private key which is used as an input to DH algorithm along with two
predefined parameters to generate public keys of sender and receiver. These
public keys are then shared between sender and receiver. DH algorithm uses
user’s own private key and other user’s public key to generate a symmetric key
at both users end. This key is termed the intermediate key which is further
hashed to generate final cryptographic key. This key is then used for encryption
and decryption of information to be shared between sender and receiver.
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This system also involves authentication of users before starting commu-
nication among them. For this, a central authority (CA) for enrollment and
verification of users has been proposed. At the time of registration, a user gen-
erates an RSA public-private key pair and shares this public key with CA along
with some identification. CA registers the user with all this information and
provides a signed certificate to the user. This certificate is used by users to
verify each other before setting up the connection as described in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Enrollment and Authentication using CA
The above-mentioned steps of the proposed framework are stated in detail
in the following subsections. Fig. 2 gives the detailed diagram of the proposed
framework.
2.1. Feature extraction
The performance of the fingerprint based verification system may degrade
due to by rotation, translation and scaling deformations caused at the time of
image acquisition. Hence, there is a need to evaluate translation and rotation-
invariant features from the fingerprint image. For this purpose, we utilize the
pair-minutiae feature extraction technique which was originally proposed by Jin
et al. in [19]. For better understanding, we briefly describe this procedure. Let,
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Figure 2: Proposed Crypto-biometric system framework
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set of minutiae points extracted from fingerprint image are denoted as:
Ms = {Msk (xk, yk, θk)}nk=1 (1)
where, n is number of minutiae points. (xk, yk, θk) are x, y coordinates and
orientation of kth minutiae, respectively. A pair minutiae vector V pij can be
formed by pairing up two minutiae Msi and Msj from set Ms. There will be
n(n−1)
2 pairs constituting the set V p which can be expressed as:
V p = {V pij : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i 6= j} (2)
where, each V pij is triplet of distance and relative angles of minutiae pair
(Msi,Msj), assuming the reference direction of line segment connecting minu-
tiae pair is from Msi to Msj . Hence, V pij is defined as:
V pij = {L,αi, βj} (3)
where, L is the distance between minutiae pairs Msi and Msj . αi is the an-
gle between reference direction of line segment joining Msi and Msj with the
orientation of Msi in the counter-clockwise direction; βj is defined analogously.
Figure 3 illustrates this triplet formation.
Msi
Msj
αi
βi
L
Figure 3: Pair-minutiae feature extraction
To determine V pij , the following two quantities X and Y are calculated
first:
X = (xj − xi)cosθi + (yj − yi)sinθi
9
Y = (xj − xi)sinθi − (yj − yi)cosθi
Next, the triplet contained in V pij = (L, αi, βj) is obtained as follows:
L =
√
X2 + Y 2 (4)
αi = arctan
(
Y
X
)
(5)
βj = αi + θj − θi (6)
After the evaluation of (L, αi, βj), quantization is applied on each V pij in
V p. (L, αi, βj) are represented in binary notation by choosing a quantization
step size. Suppose nl, nα and nβ are number of bits required to represent L,
α and β in binary notation, respectively. Then the total number of bits to
represent each V pij in V p are represented as:
np = nl + nα + nβ (7)
Thus, for each pair-minutiae vector V pij in V p, a bit-string V p
(b)
ij of np bits
is derived. The set V p(b) represents the set of V p
(b)
ij as follows:
V p(b) = {V p(b)ij : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i 6= j} (8)
Empirical evaluations find that np=15 (i.e. 5 bits for each L, α and β
provides the optimal equal error rate (EER) and the maximum entropy [Please
see Section 3.6]. Further, binning is applied on binarized pair-minutiae vector
set. Since there are 2n possible combinations of n bits, binning starts from 00
· · · 0 to 11 · · · 1. For each V p(b)ij in V p(b),we index a bin by 1 if V pij falls in
it. The bins indexed at least once are assigned 1 and all other bins are assigned
0. At the end of this procedure, a binary string hk of length 2
np is obtained in
which 1’s correspond to the unique occurrence of those V p
(b)
ij . In this work, this
binary string hk is considered as the feature vector.
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2.2. Authentication system
In crypto-biometric systems, transformation either binds or derive a crypto-
graphic key providing revocability and non-invertibility to the original biometric.
The user authentication is performed using this cryptographic key which can
easily go in hands of adversaries. However, the proposed framework does not
share or store biometric data. DH algorithm is used for generating symmet-
ric keys at both sender and receiver ends. We describe the procedure in the
following subsections.
2.2.1. Revocable transformation
To provide revocability to the bit string, random permutation is applied on
the bit string based on the user-specific key. This key is termed as transforma-
tion key for the user. The transformation key is used as seed value to generate
random numbers equal to length of feature bit string. Bits corresponding to
these random numbers are swapped with bits at positions starting from the
start and incrementing with each random number. For example, we have a bit
string of length 15 bits. The transformation key (T ) is used as seed to generate
random numbers from 1 to 15. Say, first random number generated is 5. We
swap bit at 5th position with 1st position bit. Let, next random number be 11.
Now, 2nd bit is swapped with 11th bit. This process continues till last bit is
swapped with bit at position equal to new random number. In this way, a bit
string is derived which is the permutation of original bit string.
The method ensures the generation of a revocable template from feature
bit-string of the user’s biometric since a user can utilize different values of T to
generate a different template from same feature bit string.
2.2.2. Generation of public key and cryptographic key using DH algorithm
DH algorithm which is used to enable users to securely exchange a crypto-
graphic key over public channels. We apply DH algorithm using this private
key to generate a public key for the users. Further, authentication using CA is
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carried out using public-private key pair. For convenience, the procedural steps
are as follows:
Algorithm 1 Diffie-Hellman (DH) Algorithm
1: Take a prime number q
2: Take an integer α such that α < q and α is a primitive root of q
3: For user A, select a random integer XA < q
4: Calculate YA = α
XA mod q
5: For user B, select a random integer XB < q
6: Calculate YB = α
XB mod q . YA and XA are public and private keys of
user A; YB and XB are public and private keys of user B, respectively
7: Public keys YA & YB are shared among each other
8: Calculation of cryptographic key Ks by user A as Ks = (YB)
XA mod q
9: Calculation of cryptographic key Kr by user B as Kr = (YA)
XB mod q
In DH algorithm, it is easy to calculate exponentials modulo a prime while
it is very difficult to calculate discrete logarithms. For large primes, the latter
task is considered infeasible. As discussed in subsection 2.1, n is considered to
be 15 in our approach to get a feature bit string of length 215. Same is the
length of revocable template which is permuted feature bit string. This large
binary string needs to be mapped into a smaller one which can be used as key
input for DH algorithm. For this, SHA256 hash has been used here. Permuted
binary string is hashed using SHA256 to generate a 256-bit key. This key is
termed as private key of the user. This way, private keys of sender (PRVS) and
receiver (PRVR) are generated.
Further, DH algorithm requires a large prime number q and its primitive
root α. These parameters are not required to be generated in each session, we
can also use fixed value of these parameters over a large number of sessions
(Appendix A). In this approach, DH parameters of RFC 3526: 2048-bit MODP
group [20] have been used. With private keys PRVS , PRVR, q and α, step 4
and 5 of DH algorithm are applied to generate public keys PUBS and PUBR
of sender and receiver respectively.
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Public keys PUBS and PUBR are then shared between sender and receiver.
Once both sender and receiver have each other’s public keys, DH algorithm is
applied at both ends to generate a secret key using own private key and other’s
public key, as explained in step 9 and 10 of DH algorithm. This way, both
sender and receiver derive a secret key. This key is termed as intermediate key
for the communication setup. In our approach, size of this key is 2048 bits. This
intermediate key is hashed using SHA256 to generate a 256-bit key which is the
final cryptographic key. This key is then used for encryption and decryption of
messages between sender and receiver.
2.2.3. Authentication using CA
The proposed crypto-biometric system also involves a central authority (CA)
with which all users need to be registered. When a new user joins the system,
CA requires to enroll it first. Following steps are performed in enrollment phase:
1. User generates its own set of RSA public-private key pair and sends its
public key along with its identification to the CA after encrypting it with
public key of CA.
2. CA identifies the user using this information and stores this identification
in its database.
3. CA computes hash of public key and identification of the user and encrypts
this hash, public key and identification of the user using its private key.
4. This encrypted message is termed as certificate of the user and is sent to
the user.
All users enroll with the CA to get their certificates. These certificates are
used for verification of other users before setting up a connection with them.
Suppose user A wants to communicate with user B. For this purpose, following
steps needs to be performed before setting up this connection in verification
phase:
1. A sends its certificate to the user B with a request to initiate the commu-
nication.
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2. B decrypts A’s certificate with CA’s public key and computes hash of
A’s public key and identification. This hash is matched with hash in the
certificate to verify that this certificate is indeed signed by the CA.
3. B then identifies A using its identification and then send its certificate to
A.
4. A does the same steps as B to verify B. Once verified by each other, they
can start setting up the communication using proposed approach discussed
in above subsections.
3. Experimental results and analysis
The proposed framework for secure communication is evaluated based on
the two criteria i.e. cryptographic key randomness and performance. In the fol-
lowing subsections, we present the experimental results and performance of the
proposed method. We use four performance metrics to evaluate the performance
of our method:
1. FAR: The probability of mistakenly accepting an imposter as a genuine
user
2. FRR: The probability of mistakenly rejecting a genuine user as an imposter
3. GAR: Can be calculated as 1-FRR
4. EER: The error rate where FAR and FRR hold equality
3.1. Database
The proposed method has been evaluated using the four datasets of FVC2002
[21] databases (i.e. FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3 and FVC2002DB4).
Each dataset comprises of 100 subjects with 8 impressions per subject. The per-
formance is evaluated using FVC protocol which states that all possible unique
pair of impressions from the same subjects are considered to derive genuine cryp-
tographic keys. As a result, we obtain 2800 (i.e. 8C2 × 100) genuine key com-
parisons. Next, unique pair of impression from different subjects are matched
to derive 4950 (i.e. 100C2) imposer key comparisons.
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3.2. Randomness of cryptographic key for genuine pair of subjects
To evaluate the randomness cryptographic key for genuine pair of finger-
prints, first two fingerprints of each subject from all four FVC2002 datasets
DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 are considered as a genuine pair. For each subject,
cryptographic key for first two instances of fingerprint are generated. Next, we
evaluate number of matching bits between these two keys. Hence, a total of
100 data points are calculated as percentage of matching number of bits out of
total number of bits in the generated feature string, for each dataset. A total
of 100× 4=400 data points are calculated and are illustrated using histograms
in Fig 4. It can be observed from the histogram that mean value for matching
percentage for a genuine pair of fingerprints is 89.99% which means that aver-
age number of matching bits is 3686 bits out of 4096 bits. The percentage of
matching bits is spread between the ranges of 81.37% to 99.83% with a standard
deviation of 0.043. Therefore, it is evident that a genuine pair achieves sufficient
number of matchable bits for the pair of cryptogrphic key.
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Figure 4: Hamming distances between genuine pair of cryptographic keys
15
3.3. Randomness of cryptographic key for imposter pair of subjects
To evaluate the randomness in cryptographic keys for imposter pair of users,
datasets DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 are considered. Each dataset is divided
into 50 unique pairs. For each pair, rest of the pairs are considered imposter
pairs of fingerprints. This way, a total of 50 × 49=2450 possible combinations
are possible for each genuine pair taking part in communication. Next, we
generate the cryptographic keys for each combination of genuine and imposter
pair of fingerprints in databases DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4. Hence, a total of
2450×4=9800 hamming distances have been calculated which are shown in Fig.5
using histogram. It can be observed from the histogram that mean hamming
distance is 49.94% which means that average hamming distance between genuine
and imposter keys is 128 bits. Hamming distances are spread between the range
of 37.89% to 61.72% with a standard deviation of 0.031. Also, it has been
observed that, 40% to 60% of the bits of genuine keys are different from 99.89%
imposter keys and a small number (0.04%) of imposter keys have unmatched
bits under 40%. Hence, an imposter cannot get more than 128 matched bits
out of any 256-bit cryptographic key.
3.4. Randomness of private key for different transformation key
To measure the randomness in private keys, we consider all subjects of
FVC2002DB1, FVC2002DB2, FVC2002DB3 and FVC2002DB4. Next, private
key is evaluated for 30 different randomly generated transformation keys for each
subject. Further, we evaluate the Hamming distances between the first private
key derived using transformation T and other 30 private keys. This way, a total
of 12000 hamming distances are calculated for all subjects in dataset DB1, DB2,
DB3 and DB4. Histogram of the Hamming distances is shown in Fig. 6. It can
be observed from Fig. 6 that mean hamming distance is 50.03% which means
that average hamming distance between two private keys generated using dif-
ferent transformation keys is 128 bits. Hamming distances are spread between
the range of 37.11% to 64.06% with a standard deviation of 0.031. For change
in transformation keys, 40% to 60% bits of private key are different in 99.85%
16
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Figure 5: Hamming distances between imposter pair of cryptographic keys keys
of cases. Therefore, it can be deduced that at least 128 bits of private key are
altered on changing transformation key for a subject.
3.5. Key size analysis
In literature, it has been analyzed that an authentication system requires
more than 2100 secret keys according to Alvarez et al. [22]. In his case, each key
must be strong enough and should generate random data to be resilient against
an exhaustive attack. In our method, we use 256 bit cryptographic key whose
randomness has been tested in Section 3.2-3.4. Hence, 2256 number of different
keys can be derived. The strength of derived cryptographic keys are based upon
maximum Lyapunov exponent analysis as stated in Murillo et al. [23].
3.6. Information entropy analysis
Information entropy is measured by the randomness present in a crypto-
graphic key, i.e. greater the unpredictability of the key, greater is the entropy.
17
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Figure 6: Hamming distances among private keys for different transformation keys
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Otherwise, the authentication system is susceptible to an entropy attack since
there exists a certain degree of predictability in the key generation. The entropy
H(PUB) of a key PUB can be calculated as follows:
H(PUB) =
2N−1∑
i=0
p(PUBi) log2
(
1
PUBi
)
(9)
where, N is the number of bits in the key PUB; 2N is all possible bits in key,
p(PUBi) represents a probability of any bit present in PUBi. If there is a key
PUB containing 2N possible bits, the entropy should be H(PUB)=N ideally.
The cryptographic key has 256 bits and its maximum entropy is H = 8. This
confirms that all bits appear with the same probability. The entropy of the orig-
inal template is H = 5.14, whereas the entropy of the generated cryptographic
key is H = 7.28 for the parameter np=15. Therefore, it is ascertained that the
key generation is highly pseudorandom in our method.
3.7. Performance
The proposed method has been evaluated using all datasets of (i.e. DB1,
DB2, DB3 and DB4) of FVC2002. The datasets cover a wide range of finger-
print images in terms of quality. Among these four datasets, dataset DB3 and
DB4 contains the lowest quality images. In this work, minutiae points are ex-
tracted using the commercial software VeriFinger SDK [24]. For each subject,
hamming distances between the cryptographic keys generated from genuine pair
of fingerprints and hamming distances between the cryptographic keys gener-
ated from imposter pair of fingerprints are calculated. For a genuine pair of
fingerprints, hamming distances must be minimal while for a pair genuine and
imposter fingerprint, hamming distance must be higher. The experimental re-
sults are obtained under the practical scenario when transformation key is same
for all subjects This scenario represents the stolen token case when an imposter
knows the transformation key. We have evaluated the genuine and imposter
scores using the same transformation key for each user present in the database.
The ROC curves for DB1, DB2, DB3 and DB4 of FVC2002 are shown in Fig.
7.
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From Fig. 7, it has been observed that we achieve GAR of 98.29% and
99.03% for the datasets DB1 and DB2, respectively due to the presence of more
number of good quality images. In comparison to DB1 and DB2, relatively less
number of minutiae points are extracted from fingerprints in DB3 due to the
poor-quality images with spurious and missing minutiae. As a result, we achieve
95.56% and 86.4% of GAR for DB3 and DB4, respectively. The lack of reliable
minutiae causes the degradation in performance. Further, we also evaluate the
performance after combining all the four datasets of FVC2002 resulting into
2800 × 4=11200 genuine key comparison and 4950 × 4= 19800 imposter key
comparisons. The ROC curve for the whole FVC2002 database is shown in Fig.
7. It has been observed that the GAR of the proposed method is slightly lower
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than the GAR of the method proposed in [17] since error-correction has not
been applied for the derived cryptographic keys. Clancy et al. [12] and Kanade
et al. [14] have not provided any empirical evaluation onto publicly available
databases, therefore we have not compared our method with these methods.
In addition to the datasets of FVC2002, we also tested our method with NIST
special database 4 [25]. The ROC curve for the NIST special database 4 [25] is
illustrated in Fig. 8. It is worth mentioning that the proposed method achieves
a GAR of 96.73% for partial NIST special database 4, which is better than
the reported 95.12% GAR in [18]. However, we obtain high FAR for NIST
special database since the error-correction codes have not been applied over
cryptographic keys. The performance comparison of the proposed method with
some existing cryptosystem design framework is reported in Table 1. We have
compared our method with the approaches proposed by Barman et al. [17] and
Panchal et al. [18] due to the scarcity of the research work carried out in this
direction and the proposed work achieves the best performance over the current
state-of-the-art. From the reported results in Table 1, we can observe that the
performance of the proposed method for whole FVC2002 database is slightly
lower than [17] but it is comparable.
Table 1: Comparison with existing crypto-biometric systems
GAR ( FAR / FRR )
Methods
FVC2002 database NIST special database 4
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1+DB2+DB3+DB4 Partial data Full data
Barman et al. [17] - - - -
97
( 0.562 / - )
- -
Panchal et al. [18] - - - - -
95.12
( 0 / 4.72 )
-
Proposed method
98.29
(0.2/1.45)
99.03
(0.11/0.72)
95.56
(1.8/7.73)
86.4
(3.08/19.45)
96.49
(0.61/2.81)
96.73
( 0.83 / 6.3 )
95.89
( 0.762 / 8.1 )
4. Security analysis
In our approach, biometrics of users are neither stored nor shared. Two users
can communicate with each other without the worry of storing or sharing their
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biometric data. In this section, we focus on security of the proposed framework
against various possible attacks. Analysis of different attacks show that our
approach is robust enough against privacy invasion and security thefts.
4.1. Security of DH algorithm
In DH key exchange, it is relatively easy to calculate exponentials modulo
a prime while it is very difficult to calculate discrete logarithms. For larger
primes, the latter task is considered infeasible [26]. DH algorithm requires two
parameters q and α. For example, prime number q be 353 and its primitive
root α be 3. A and B select private keys XA = 97 and XB = 233 respectively.
Now, the public keys become:
YA = 3
97 mod 353 = 40
YB = 3
233 mod 353 = 248
After exchanging public keys, common secret key is:
Kr = (YA)
XB mod 353 = 24897 mod 353 = 160
Ks = (YB)
XA mod 353 = 40233 mod 353 = 160
Assume that, an attacker gets q, α, YA and YB . To evaluate the secret
key Kr or Ks, an attacker needs to solve the expression 3
97 mod 353 = 40 or
3233 mod 353 = 248. However, the evaluation becomes impractical for larger
primes. Hence, even if an attacker gets access to the public keys, private keys
cannot be generated. This ensures that there is no information which the at-
tacker can utilize to reveal the original biometric information of users.
4.2. Security of cryptographic key
In this approach, cryptographic key is generated from biometric of sender
and receiver using DH algorithm. This key is valid for only for a session and is
destroyed as soon as the session is destroyed. This key is never shared or stored.
Therefore, there is no way to get this key by attacking the network. Further,
we analyze the security of this system against different possible attacks.
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4.2.1. Network attack
Assume that, an attacker invades the security of network and takes control
over all the information shared over the network. In our method, public keys
of sender and receiver are the only information shared over the network before
generating a secure session key. Even if an attacker is able to unveil the public
keys of sender and receiver, no information can be reverse-engineered using these
keys as discussed in section 4.1.
4.2.2. Attack on a host
I this attack, an attacker take control over a user/host in the network and
gets all the information available at the user end. In this system, a user stores
transformation key, cryptographic session key, public-private key pair and au-
thentication certificate. With all this information, the attacker gets access only
for that session. An attacker can log all the encrypted transmissions and can get
stored messages of that user, but the attacker still can’t decrypt these messages.
As cryptographic keys are changed in each session and are not related in any
way except that they are generated from original biometric of user, an attacker
can access messages of that session only. For decrypting messages of previous
communications and to encrypt messages of future conversations, an attacker
still needs original biometric of the user which we can assume will be secure
with the user. This way, access to cryptographic key of a session gives access
to messages of that session only, neither the previous nor the future commu-
nications. This property is called perfect forward secrecy which the proposed
system achieves.
4.2.3. Replay attack
In this attack, a falsified data is injected between the sensor and feature
extractor. To avoid this, we utilize the session key between two users. For
each session, a different cryptographic key is generated and destroyed after the
session gets over. If an attacker eavesdrops a message previously transmitted
by genuine users, it would fail since cryptographic key is changed. Even if an
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attacker eavesdrops one of the public keys shared between two users to launch
replay attack, it would not be possible to derive cryptographic keys as it requires
user’s own private key along with public key. This way, the proposed system
found to be secure against replay attacks.
4.2.4. Man in the middle (MiM) attack
In MiM attack, the attacker inserts him/herself into a communication be-
tween two users, impersonates both users and gains access to information that
the two users are trying to send to each other. To avoid MiM attack, two users
need to verify each other before starting communication. In this method, this
verification takes place using certificates provided by trusted certification au-
thority (CA). This verification before communication setup makes sure that a
user is communicating with the genuine user at the other end avoiding the MiM.
If a MiM eavesdrops two users certificate at the time of verification and sends
his certificate to both of them to setup two-way communications simultaneously,
he will be verified as himself not the genuine user with which a user wishes to
setup the communication. Even for this to happen, a MiM needs to have an au-
thentication certificate provided by the CA which can only be provided to him
after verifying his identity. Therefore, an attacker could not be able to get the
certificate from CA without identifying himself. Once identified, it would not be
possible to launch MiM attack since attacker’s identity will be revealed. User’s
verification from CA prevents the authentication system from MiM attacks in
the proposed method.
5. Conclusion and future scope
Cryptographic key generation and subsequently its security are the two im-
portant issues in traditional cryptography. In this work, we address these issues
and provide a novel approach to generate symmetric cryptographic keys using
fingerprint biometrics of sender and receiver. We utilize invariant features be-
tween pair-minutiae vectors to mitigate the adverse effect over performance due
to non-linear deformation at the time of acquisition. To provide revocability to
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the bit string, random permutation is applied on the bit string based on the user-
specific key. Next, the revocable bit strings are fed to DH algorithm along with
two predefined parameters to generate public keys of sender and receiver. DH
algorithm utilizes user’s own private key and other user’s public key to generate
a session key at both users end. This key is further hashed to generate final cryp-
tographic key. We evaluated our method onto all four datasets i.e.DB1-DB4 of
FVC2002 and NIST special database 4. The experimental results demonstrate
that the GAR of 96.49% and 95.89% for FVC2002 database and NIST special
databases, respectively which indicates that our approach performs better than
the existing approaches. The proposed method outperforms against different
attacks such as network attack, attack on a host, replay attack and MiM at-
tacks. Thus, this proposed approach provides an effective solution to the need
of session-based secure communication setup for transmitting messages over an
insecure communication channel. In future, there is a scope of optimizing this
approach in terms of performance by applying error-correction codes over the
cryptographic keys. In addition, the secure crypto-biometric system design for
multimodal biometric systems can be looked into the future.
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Appendix A
DH parameters:
The following parameters (RFC 3526 : 2048-bit MODP group) were used for
implementing DH algorithm.
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1:] Prime number (for modulo) q:
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD1
29024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DD
EF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245
E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7ED
EE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3D
C2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F
83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D
670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3B
E39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9
DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA0510
15728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
Primitive root (generator) α: 2
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